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Vatican II and Intellectual Conversion: Engaging the Struggle Within 
Dennis M. Doyle 
University of Dayton  
 
In 1980 I took a course with Joseph Komonchak entitled “The History and Theology of Vatican 
II” at the Catholic University of America. True to the title, Komonchak was doing history and theology 
together at the same time on a class-by-class basis. He would bring in documents from the Council and 
from the times leading up to it, often in Latin, and he would talk about how his goals as a theologian 
required him to work in a historical manner. To understand Vatican II, or the Church itself for that matter, 
required not just understanding theological concepts but also grasping them in their historical context.  
Komonchak emphasized how James Gustafson brought out in Treasure in Earthen Vessels that the 
divinely instituted Church is lived out as an historical and social reality.
1
 The response of human beings to 
God’s gracious offer is not only continually empowered by God but also truly free and subject to 
limitations and sin. The Church is simultaneously holy and always in need of reform and renewal. To 
study the Church requires that theologians attend to its various dimensions, including both those divinely 
instituted and those humanly lived out.  
Komonchak’s course had a lasting impact on my work as a theologian. Although he rarely 
mentioned Lonergan in that course, I had heard that he was a “Lonerganian.” It was not until many years 
later that I read articles by him on Lonergan and ecclesiology.
2
 In retrospect, I can see that the 
connections between Lonergan and what Komonchak was doing in that course were thick and deep. I had 
absolutely no idea at that time that ecclesiology would become my own area of theological specialization, 
                                                          
1
 See James Gustafson, Treasure in Earthen Vessels: The Church as a Human Community (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1961).  
2
 See Joseph A. Komonchak, Foundations in Ecclesiology, Supplementary Issue of the Lonergan Workshop Journal, 
vol. 11, ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston: Boston College, 1995). Three of the eight essays in this work had initially been 
published in 1981 and one in 1988. The other four essays stemmed from lectures given in 1975.  
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nor that Bernard Lonergan would become the subject of my dissertation as well as the great influence on 
my own intellectual development.   
In an “Editorial Note” at the beginning of Foundations in Ecclesiology, Fred Lawrence identifies 
Komonchak as one occupying what Lonergan famously called the “perhaps not numerous center,” that is 
neither the “solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists” nor the “the scattered 
left, captured by now this, now that new possibility.”3 The present situation of the Catholic Church in 
North America and Europe is one of division into intellectual camps, and the interpretation of the Second 
Vatican Council serves as one of the main battlefields around which we assemble. One of the key issues 
regards how we deal with change. How do we understand the relationship between continuity and 
discontinuity? In this essay I draw upon Lonergan in order to understand something of the debate about 
continuity and change at Vatican II and how that debate plays out across the spectrum of theological 
stances.  My main point of focus is on what Lonergan called intellectual conversion.
4
 A consideration of 
intellectual conversion will help us to think about precisely this issue of continuity and change in the 
teaching and reception of Vatican II.
5
  In this essay I am adding my own twist to “intellectual conversion” 
by the way in which I emphasize how it calls for one to engage in the struggle within.
6
 
In 1982 I had a personal encounter with Bernard Lonergan. I was living in Columbus, Ohio at the 
time. My dissertation involved a comparison between Lonergan and Wilfred Cantwell Smith on the topic 
of faith, belief, and truth.
7
 Both of them were in Boston in 1982.  I wrote to each of them requesting a 
meeting on a certain day on which I planned to travel to Boston myself. Smith agreed at once. Then one 
                                                          
3
 Komonchak, Foundations, iii. 
4
 A fuller discussion of “conversion” in Lonergan would explore the threefold dimensions of conversion as religious, 
moral, and intellectual, as well as the interrelationship among them. See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology 
(New York: Seabury, 1972), 237-44.  See also Komonchak’s discussion of conversion in Foundations, 43-45; 97-98; 
180-81.  
5
 The body of this paper was given as a lecture at the Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, June 15, 2014. It 
builds upon several contributions made at the 2012 Lonergan Workshop, especially those by Michael Vertin, “”On 
Insight: Introductory”; Richard Liddy, “Vatican II and Intellectual Conversion;” and John Dadosky, “’A Leap 
Forward’: Mutuality, Authenticity, Collegiality and the Significance of Vatican II.”   
6
 Komonchak discusses Lonergan’s “existentialist thrust” as well of his focus on “authenticity” in Foundations, 98-
99.  
7
 See Dennis M. Doyle, “The Distinction between Faith and Belief and the Question of Religious Truth: The 
Contributions of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan,” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1984). 
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morning when I was in the shower my wife announced that Father Lonergan was on the phone. I went to 
the phone dripping wet and said, “Hello, Fr. Lonergan.” He replied, “The topic which you have chosen 
for your dissertation is unworkable for two reasons. First, what Smith means by faith and what I mean by 
faith are two entirely different things. By “faith” Smith means the faith of the Enlightenment scientists in 
the eighteenth century. My own meaning of faith is drawn more from Thomas Aquinas. Second, I have 
not written enough about faith and belief in my own work for anyone to imagine that they could possibly 
write an entire dissertation about it.” I said, “But Father Lonergan, my committee approved my 
dissertation topic a year ago and I’ve been working on it all this time.” He said, “Well, that is my 
opinion.” I replied, “Fr. Lonergan, thank you for your opinion.” He responded, “No charge.”  
I called a few of my teachers over the next few days. They all said that I couldn’t let it end that 
way. So when I arrived in Boston one morning I made my way to St. Mary’s Hall at Boston College and 
asked if I could speak with Fr. Lonergan, and they gave me his phone number. I called him from a pay 
phone on the first floor. When I said I was in Boston and asked him if I could meet with him that day, his 
voice sounded a little relieved, maybe a little repentant. He arranged to meet with me later that evening. 
He had no idea that I was standing in his building, and I did not tell him. 
So, I took the train over to Harvard to meet with Smith, who was very gracious to me, and then 
went back to St. Mary’s that evening to meet with Lonergan. He was perhaps just slightly gruff at first, 
but after I explained to him that my main focus was on the question of religious truth, and that perhaps I 
tended to favor his positions over those of Smith, he warmed up to me.  When I told him that some of my 
own motivations for study arose from doubts I experienced due to my interest in world religions, he said, 
“Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt.” It was not until sometime later that I learned that he 
was repeating to me a famous quote from John Henry Newman.
8
 Overall Fr. Lonergan was very caring 
and pastoral to me.  He was interested not just in my technical thoughts about faith and belief in relation 
to truth, but also in the life-world within which my concern for this topic had been generated. In 
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 See John Henry Newman: Apologia pro Vita Sua: Being a History of His Religious Opinions (London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1909), 264. 
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retrospect, I can see that he very easily moved back and forth between the realm of theory and the 
everyday commonsense realm. As I will explain, the ability to do this is indicative of “intellectual 
conversion.” 
Lonergan’s description of the goal of Insight, “the appropriation of one’s own intellectual and 
rational self-consciousness,” can be used as an initial definition of intellectual conversion.9 It is a matter 
of knowing what one is doing when one is knowing. It requires a recognition of the errors associated with 
a naïve realism. It calls for understanding what the skeptics and relativists understand, but also for 
detecting the misunderstandings that prevent them from affirming themselves as knowers. Intellectual 
conversion results in both a theoretical and a practical grasp of how various expressions of human 
knowing result from the various ways in which human consciousness can be differentiated.  
To engage in the struggle within requires an ability to affirm whatever can legitimately be 
affirmed across a wide spectrum of positions.  It involves internalizing a wide range of positions. I am not 
putting this notion forward as a universal position suitable for all times, but rather as a contextual 
emphasis suitable to our current situation with its tendency toward polarization. My initial considerations 
will be focused on the individual, but I intend always to keep the community dimensions in mind.
10
 
I will focus on two ways in which different forms of knowing can appear at first to be 
contradictory but which may turn out to be complementary. The first of these concerns the relationship 
between commonsense and theory.
11
 The second concerns the relationship between classical procedures 
of investigation and statistical procedures of investigation. In between I will have some things to say 
about the subject of bias.   
The commonsense realm of meaning expresses how things are related to us.  The sun rises in the 
East. It operates more on the level of description than of explanation, though it does contain some 
                                                          
9
 See Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. 
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992 [1957]), 22. 
10
 Komonchak explains how Lonergan’s approach in Insight, though it may appear to some to be individualistic, is 
thoroughly grounded within a communal, social, and political framework. See Foundations, 17-27; 136-37. 
11
 See Lonergan, Insight, 196-269 as well as Method, 81-85; 114-15; 120; 257-62; 265-66; 272; 304.  See also 
Komonchak’s discussion of common sense and theory in ecclesiology in Foundations, 50-56.  
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explanations that remain rooted in understanding things as they relate to me or to my group. 
Commonsense admits of a positive definition and a negative definition. Speaking positively, the 
commonsense realm consists in the everyday world of meaning in which we all live. It is a world of 
shared presuppositions, know-how, and values. What operates as commonsense differs in different times 
and places. Also, there are various types of commonsense connected with various everyday 
specializations. Not everyone in a particular time and place is privy to every specialized form of 
commonsense.  But virtually everyone does share in a basic world of meaning that offers a common stock 
of knowledge and that is guided by aphorisms and proverbs. A stitch in time saves nine. Look before you 
leap. A nod is as good as a wink. There are some people who are said to lack commonsense. These would 
be people who analyze even the smallest everyday matters in a theoretical way and who can become 
almost paralyzed over the tiniest type of actions and decisions.   
The realm of commonsense can also be defined in a negative way.  It is a realm that lacks 
differentiation of consciousness.  An initial type of differentiation of consciousness involves the move to 
the level of theory. The theoretical realm of meaning tries to express how things are related among 
themselves. It seeks what is true in an overall, more universal sense.  The reason why the sun appears to 
rise in the East is because the earth spins on its axis as it revolves around the sun. People operating within 
the commonsense realm of meaning might resist or even reject what theory has to offer. Galileo did not 
have an easy time in garnering full support for the heliocentric understanding of our solar system. The 
overall tendency to resist or even reject theory is what Lonergan labels commonsense bias, also called 
general bias. Some people get so stuck in the realm of commonsense meaning that they refuse even to 
consider perspectives that in some cases represent a relatively higher viewpoint.  
One of the capacities that Lonergan explicitly associates with intellectual conversion is being able 
to recognize commonsense and theory as expressing legitimate modes of knowing and thus being able to 
grasp them in a complementary fashion. It is true at the same time that the sun rises in the East and that 
the sun appears to rise in the East because of the spinning of the earth upon its own axis as it revolves 
around the sun. The sun rising in the East expresses meaning in the commonsense realm regarding things 
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as they relate to us. The more complex relations between the earth and the sun in a heliocentric solar 
system represent what we can grasp about the way in which things relate among themselves.  
Commonsense bias is never a good thing but one may understand sympathetically many of its 
individual component causes. Europeans in the seventeenth century had good reasons to doubt Galileo.  
The heliocentric theory violated commonsense in several ways. This theory seemed to contradict a plain 
reading of sacred scripture. It offended the sense that not only is our world the center of one planetary 
system but also of the entire created universe. In addition, it is the case that if one leaps straight up from 
the ground into the air, one lands in the same place from which one started.  The earth does not seem to be 
spinning rapidly beneath our feet when we are suspended above it.  
Still, it turned out that Galileo was basically right. John Paul II even apologized for the Church’s 
role in the Galileo affair.
12
 Lonergan, however, points out one major problem with Galileo. Galileo 
thought that he had discovered the true reality of the relation between the sun and the earth and that the 
sun rising in the East is a mere appearance. It would be as though you could say to someone, if you think 
that the sun rises in the East, you are wrong. The sun does not really rise in the East. That is a mere 
appearance. According to Lonergan, however, the intellectually converted person will understand that 
commonsense and theory represent two distinct realms of meaning that are complementary.  Galileo 
being right about heliocentrism does not mean that the sun doesn’t rise in the East. I can watch it happen 
any morning that I choose, at least if it isn’t too foggy. Knowing that the sun rises in the East can help me 
to find my way through the forest or navigate my ship. I can write a meaningful poem about it.  
Lonergan named and explained four types of bias: commonsense, individual, group, and 
dramatic. Commonsense bias is one that resists or even rejects the realm of theory. Commonsense bias 
finds a way to reject systematic and long-term solutions to the problems that we face.  Galileo manifested 
his own type of bias, though it was not one of the four that Lonergan explicitly enumerated. Still, it is 
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 See Luigi Accattoli, When a Pope Asks Forgiveness: The Mea Culpa’s of John Paul II, trans. Jordan Aumann (New 
York: Alba, 1998 [1997]), 125-37.   
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something Lonergan described in his discussion of Galileo and in other places.  I do not think he gives it a 
label at all, though I will call it “theoretical bias.”13  
Theoretical bias is the use of theory to unnecessarily contradict or to diminish knowledge as it 
operates in the commonsense realm. It is related to a failure to be aware of the positive meaning of the 
commonsense realm or to acknowledge the many ways in which the commonsense realm legitimately 
takes priority over the realm of theory. Although knowledge is in some important ways to be pursued for 
its own sake, in other important ways knowledge is pursued as it is connected with the common good.
14
 In 
my judgment, theory should in many though not in all cases operate in service to the realm of 
commonsense. Yes, in an initial manner theory represents an advance over commonsense, a higher 
viewpoint. In the bigger picture, however, the commonsense realm of meaning in which we live out our 
everyday lives among each other retains a high level of importance that theory should support rather than 
detract from. Often such support comes in the form of corrections or of general shaping and molding of 
the commonsense world. A rationalist looks at commonsense and thinks it is bad theory. Commonsense, 
however, is not a theory by which we understand the world but rather the common set of understandings 
according to which we live together in this world.  
In the twenty-first century the knowledge that the earth spins while it revolves around the sun has 
become part of our commonsense. Such knowledge has been around for a long time, and we are used to it. 
Human beings have traveled to the moon and back.  All of us have seen pictures taken from outer space 
of the Earth against the background of other planetary objects. We have adjusted our worldview so that 
the heliocentric theory no longer rocks our world. What counts as commonsense and what counts as 
theory are somewhat relative to each other as they change over time. There are today still plenty of 
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 John Dadosky, in conversation with Robert Doran, independently developed what he calls “intellectualist bias,” 
which is identical to what I am here labelling “theoretical bias.” See “Desire, Bias, and Love: Revisiting Lonergan’s 
Philosophical Anthropology,” Irish Theological Quarterly 77/3: 244-64. Dadosky refers also to a related concept, 
that of “monomorphic bias,” articulated by Mark D. Morelli in “Common Sense from Below Upwards: Mediating 
Self-Correcting Folk Psychology,” Lonergan Workshop 15 (1999): 117–140, at 129 (available through the website: 
www.lonerganresource.com).  
14
 On page 168 of Foundations, Komonchak wrote, “a theology intended to serve the self-realization of the 




occasions, however, for the realms of meaning of commonsense and theory to be at odds. Intellectual 
conversion involves a move to the third realm of meaning, the realm of interiority.
15
 Getting to know 
something about how one’s mind works gives one the ability to grasp how the realms of commonsense 
and theory can be understood as complementary.  
One time many, many years ago I was working with a catechumenate group in my parish. One of 
the participants spoke of how he found the faith of Abraham, who was willing even to sacrifice his own 
son, to be inspiring. I remember thinking that maybe I should share with him my knowledge that 
Abraham probably did not exist as one historical person.  I possessed the new knowledge of the historical 
critics, and I felt tempted to share this knowledge in such a way as to crush the commonsense realm of my 
fellow parishioner. Something—whether we call it the Holy Spirit or in this case maybe just 
commonsense—stopped me. Something saved me at that moment from what I would now label my 
“theoretical bias.” I just nodded my head. Yes, Abraham’s faith is inspiring. 
I have often come across such a theoretical bias in the academic world. The Jesus Seminar is a 
striking example.
16
  They would regularly announce their findings, which remained quite speculative to 
say the least, with a sensationalist flair. Jesus was a cynic philosopher; Jesus never preached the Sermon 
on the Mount; there was no Last Supper. Apart from the question of whether or not what they would say 
is true is the question of whether it is a good thing to unleash an intellectual bombardment on the 
commonsense world of meaning in which many people of faith dwell in everyday life. This shock and 
awe approach is an extreme example of what I am labeling “theoretical bias.” Those who operate with a 
theoretical bias lack a proper distinction between the realms of theory and of commonsense. Somewhat 
like the way in which one with a commonsense bias believes that everything boils down to commonsense, 
the person with a theoretical bias thinks that everything boils down to theory.  
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 See Lonergan, Method, 83-85; 274-75. Lonergan adds also a fourth realm of meaning, “transcendence.”  
16
 See Robert W. Funk, The Gospel of Jesus, according to the Jesus Seminar (Salem, OR: Polebridge, 1999); for a 
critical approach to the work of the Jesus Seminar, see Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus: The Misguided Quest 
for the Historical Jesus and the Truth of the Traditional Gospel (New York: HarperCollins, 1996).  
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I came up with this label, “theoretical bias,” several years ago when I served as a theological 
respondent as the final speaker at a symposium on the role of the historical-critical method in the study of 
scripture.
17
 At this conference there were two camps. One group acknowledged only the most limited role 
that one could imagine for the historical-critical method. They would concede that there were occasions 
upon which this method had proved useful, but in the big picture its use tended to supplant other, more 
faith-filled approaches to understanding scripture. This group stressed that scripture needs to be 
approached from within a tradition being lived out within the context of a faith-filled community attentive 
to God’s saving message as expressed throughout the entire canon of scripture.  They thought that when 
the historical-critical method takes over as the fundamental framework for scripture studies, rightful 
priorities are turned upside down and the result is a host of speculations built upon other speculations and 
so on in an infinite regress providing a stability that is somewhat like that of a house of cards.  
The scholars of the other camp conceded that the historical-critical method can be misused or 
overused, but mainly they treated it as if it were an important functional specialty in the field of scripture 
studies, one that does operate as a kind of starting point. Not every scripture scholar has to either begin 
with or focus on historical-critical methods, but they need at least to be familiar with the results of such 
methods and thus presuppose them as a kind of starting point. These scholars held that different tasks in 
scripture studies could be performed somewhat independently of each other. Such tasks include canonical 
criticism as well as the history of how scripture has been received and interpreted throughout the 
centuries. These scholars found less of a need to provide direct fodder to theology. They held that in 
biblical studies, the relative autonomy of various tasks from each other as well as the distance of their 
discipline from the discipline of theology strengthened what they had to offer. 
Now I should clarify that the people in these two groups were not completely at odds with each 
other. The presenters had been hand-picked as moderate and open-minded representatives of their 
respective viewpoints. I found a positive way to speak about their differences: they were guarding against 
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 Dennis M. Doyle, “Systematic Theology’s Response to Biblical Exegesis,” unpublished paper given at a one-day 
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June 23, 2006. 
10 
 
different forms of bias. The first group was protecting a kind of scripture-informed commonsense realm 
against any kind of theoretical bias. The second group was immersed in the world of theory and were 
guarding against any kind of commonsense bias.  I find it not too difficult to turn within and find some 
sympathy for both of these basic concerns.  That is, I can locate the struggle between these two points of 
view within myself. There is a dialectic taking place within me. I can move toward a higher viewpoint 
from which I can experience these two approaches as complementary. One group uses theory to protect 
the commonsense realm against theoretical bias.  The other group uses theory as a way to move beyond 
commonsense bias. These goals, though somewhat contrasting, do not need to be placed in dire 
opposition. 
I do not wish to deny that there are many differences that remain between these two points of 
view, that there may be some points concerning which their horizons are contradictory rather than 
complementary, and that each group may be continuing to operate with their own biases. I think, though, 
that the practice of intellectual conversion by which the realms of commonsense and theory can be read as 
complementary can provide a framework within which there is some potential for at least some degree of 
these groups coming to terms with each other. For there is a way in which the commonsense realm is 
prior to the realm of theory, but there is also a way in which after our explorations in the realm of theory 
we need to return to live together in the commonsense everyday realm.  
Vatican II’s Dei Verbum can be interpreted as calling for a higher viewpoint that holds together 
the commonsense realm of meaning with what can be known through academic study. This is not to say 
that the majority of those who contributed to the authoring and editing of Dei Verbum explicitly 
envisioned such a synthesis. The final text resulted from debates and compromises among groups with 
different theological agendas. Some of the debates revolved around the tensions between modern biblical 
scholarship and the historicity of the Gospels.
18
 Christophe Theobald reports (1) that Karl Rahner argued 
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 A report of the discussions and debates behind the composition of Dei Verbum can be found in Ronald D. 
Witherup, Scripture: Dei Verbum. Series: Rediscovering Vatican II (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2006). See also 
Christophe Theobald, “The Church under the Word of God,” in History of Vatican II, 5 volumes, Ed. Giuseppe 
Alberigo, English language ed.  Joseph A. Komonchak (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995—2006) V, 275-362. 
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for a complementarity between the use of relevance for salvation as a formal criterion of truth and a 
viewpoint that recognizes that the material elements of the texts are relative to the culture
19
 and also (2) 
that Julius Döpfner explained how Rahner’s position does not section off some parts of scripture as truth, 
but rather gives two points of view from which all of scripture must be interpreted. Theobald then 
comments, however: “In my opinion, neither the higher authorities of the Council nor a considerable part 
of the assembly grasped this argument, which presupposed a real conversion of mentalities.”20 
Still, beyond what may or may not have been intended at the time, Dei Verbum presents its 
interpreters with the challenge of attaining a higher viewpoint in order to reconcile different types of 
knowing that result from different operations of consciousness. On the one hand, the document expressed 
a basic openness to contemporary methods of biblical study. It calls for careful investigation of biblical 
texts with special attention given to literary forms:  
For truth is set forth and expressed differently in texts which are variously historical, prophetic, 
poetic, or of other forms of discourse. The interpreter must investigate what meaning the sacred 
writer intended to express and actually expressed in particular circumstances by using 
contemporary literary forms in accordance with the situation of his own time and culture. (#12) 
Paying attention to literary forms and particular circumstances of composition, however, puts into 
question the historicity of various passages. For example, most biblical scholars at the time of the Council 
accepted that certain things depicted as being said by Jesus, such as negative comments directed toward 
“the Jews,” most likely reflected not something that Jesus actually said but rather reflected a conflict 
between some Jewish and Christian communities during the times in which the gospels were composed.  
 On the other hand, Dei Verbum also declared: 
Holy Mother Church has firmly and with absolute constancy held, and continues to hold, that the 
four Gospels just named, whose historical character the Church unhesitatingly asserts, faithfully 
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Theobald, History of Vatican II, V, 343. 
20
 Theobald, History of Vatican II, V, 349.  
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hand on what Jesus Christ, while living among men, really did and taught for their eternal 
salvation until the day He was taken up into heaven. (#19) 
Both this passage and the previous one are carefully phrased such that, given careful attention, they do not 
necessarily conflict with one another. The second passage does not say that every word that Jesus is 
depicted as saying was actually spoken by him. Still, there is at least on the surface some tension between 
an emphasis on literary forms used in particular circumstances and an emphasis on the trustworthy 
historical natural of the Gospels. Reconciling the different ways of knowing reflected in such passages 
calls for intellectual conversion.  
I have been thinking about commonsense and theory for a number of years. It is just in the past 
couple of years that I have been thinking quite a bit about what Lonergan calls the complementarity of 
classical procedures of investigation and statistical procedures of investigation.
21
 The classical procedures 
of early modern science (Galileo, Newton) seek knowledge that is universal and that issues in iron-clad 
laws. In economics, there is the law of supply and demand. Markets must be allowed to run their course 
with as little interference as possible.  
Classical procedures of investigation can work together with medieval theory (Aquinas) 
concerning natural law, which is based on universalizing what is true about the human person based on 
what we can discern of God’s designs. Human beings have reason and freedom but they are also inhibited 
by sin. It is important that human beings be motivated to work. Social systems that follow the invariable 
laws of economics provide such motivations. If one is capable of working and one wants to eat, then one 
must work. Both medieval natural law as well as the laws of economics provided concepts that were 
considered to be not only accurate descriptions and explanations but also the basis for what is morally 
normative. 
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 See Lonergan, Insight, 126-162; 327.  For an analysis of Lonergan’s methodology applied to economics in the 
context of the early twenty-first century United State, see Stephen Martin, “‘Irrational Exuberance’ at the Foot of 
the Cross: Redeeming the Rhythms of Economic Life,” in Finding Salvation in Christ: Essays on Christology and 
Soteriology in Honor of William P. Loewe, eds. Christopher D. Denny and Christopher McMahon (Eugene, OR: 
Pickwick, 2011), 238-61.   
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Statistical procedures of investigation bring with them a worldview with a very different 
assessment of what is considered normal or normative. Statistical procedures arrive at certain standards 
and then measure frequencies of variations from those standards. Lonergan used the example of 
Keynesian economics. During the Great Depression the system guided by so-called invariable laws of 
economics had broken down. Keynes, using statistical analysis, theorized that some amount of deficit-
spending would stimulate the economy and move in the direction of a recovery. Writing in the 1950’s, 
Lonergan had little doubt that this statistically based approach represented a clear advance in economic 




Lonergan, however, did not abandon classical modes of thought.  He did say that in relation to 
statistical procedures, classical procedures have become something new.
23
 The older classical approach 
with its changeless norms will no longer do. Many elements of what classical procedures put forward can 
be measured and challenged by statistical procedures. Statistical procedures force the recognition that the 
results of classical procedures are abstract and that its systematic understandings cannot account for 
everything.  
Statistical procedures involve a different type of abstraction, yet one that remains dependent upon 
classical procedures. Statistical procedures measure the frequency of occurrence of events and extrapolate 
probabilities, but these events need to be described and explained as well-formulated problems before the 
statistician can measure anything. These formulations are provided by classical procedures, though it is 
classical procedures as themselves corrected and shaped by statistical procedures. And so classical 
procedures of inquiry and statistical procedures of inquiry need each other.  Although they represent 
different ways of knowing and may yield apparent contractions, in the big picture they are 
                                                          
22
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I was teaching Insight and Method in a course at the University of Augsburg in the 2012-13 
academic year and at this point my students were begging me for examples. I want to be clear, however, 
that my examples represent my own attempts to apply Lonergan, and it is possible that I may be using 
Lonerganian terms and concepts in an idiosyncratic way.  
 
One example I gave my students is suicide. Classical Christian thought regards suicide to be a 
great sin. Statistical studies going back to Durkheim reveal that rates of suicide can be correlated with 
other social factors.
25
 In a Catholic Encyclopedia article from 1911 there is an acknowledgement that 
statistical studies indicate that suicide is often not simply a free act.
26
  Still, says the author of the article, 
it is better not to bury one who commits suicide within the Church.  The New Catholic Encyclopedia as it 
appeared after the Council has a similar argument but virtually the opposite conclusion.
27
  In cases that 
involve a judgment call, it is usually better that a victim of suicide be given the benefit of the doubt and 
be buried inside the Church. In my judgment, what we observe in this shift is the result of a dialectic 
being worked out between a classical view and a more statistically-informed view. An initial stage of this 
dialectic was present already in 1911. Already at that time the Durkheimian perspective was beginning to 
be considered. The postconciliar teaching represents a more developed stage of this dialectic.  Church 
teaching in this case is recognizing the complementarity of these two ways of knowing.  
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A second example I gave my students is homosexuality. Aquinas thought that homosexual acts 
are not found even among animals and therefore represent an unnatural behavior lower than that of the 
beasts.
28
 I am told that contemporary biology does find some examples of same-sex relation taking place 
among animals. My main point, here, though, is that statistics show that homosexual orientation—a 
complex subject with its own variations—exists as a percentage within any sizable human population.  
The definitions as well as the numbers are contested.  But it is well-accepted that within a population of 
any size, a considerable percentage will have a homosexual orientation.  From a statistical viewpoint, it 
would not be normal not to have a certain number of people with a homosexual orientation. Now what is 
statistically probable does not necessarily constitute what should be morally normative. No matter how 
many people commit suicide, most of us are not prepared to see suicide when committed as a free act as 
morally acceptable. In the case of homosexuality, however, it seems to me that there is being worked out 
a dialectic that has implications regarding moral norms. Aquinas’ natural law dismissal of homosexual 
acts is based upon a judgment that reflects a one-size fits all classical theory without the type of statistical 
perspective that might yield a more empathetic understanding of those with a homosexual orientation.  A 
dialectic has already been working out in contemporary Catholic teaching, with the acceptance of 
homosexual orientation, even though labeled a disorder, as not in itself sinful, as a first step.
29
 To begin a 
Catholic consideration of homosexuality with a focus on all of us being made in the image and likeness of 
God, all of us having a fundamental dignity as an object of God’s love, represents a radically new 
emphasis, the theological and moral implications of which have yet to be fully worked out.
30
 
A new development calls for a dialectic, and there is a tremendous amount of wisdom in classical 
approaches to the understanding of the human person and of sexuality and of moral responsibility that 
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continue as part of this dialectic. When change takes place in Catholic teaching and practice, it is 
important to explain in an honest and intellectually responsible manner how important and true elements 
of continuity can be found.  
Gaudium et spes develops as a major theme the need to fit together, on the one hand, Christian 
faith with its classical modes of thinking and, on the other hand, the methods and findings of the 
contemporary sciences, with frequent mention of the social sciences. In comparison with Dei Verbum, 
Gaudium et spes is more conscious and explicit in calling forth the various elements that make up what 
we are here labelling “intellectual conversion.” The document assigns to the Church “the duty of 
scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel” (#4). It proclaims 
that “Today, the human race is involved in a new stage of history” (#4), one in great need of “artisans of a 
new humanity” (#30). The reader is told that “Advances in biology, psychology, and the social sciences 
not only bring men hope of improved self-knowledge; in conjunction with technical methods, they are 
helping men exert direct influence on the life of social groups” (#5). The sciences possess a legitimate 
autonomy such that, “if methodical investigation within every branch of learning is carried out in a 
genuinely scientific manner and in accord with moral norms, it never truly conflicts with faith, for earthly 
matters and the concerns of faith derive from the same God” (#36) 
Some passages in Gaudium et spes might lead a reader who did not know better to suspect that 
Lonergan himself had been working on the writing committee:  
How is the dynamism and expansion of a new culture to be fostered without losing a 
living fidelity to the heritage of tradition? This question is of particular urgency when a culture 
which arises from the enormous progress of science and technology must be harmonized with a 
culture nourished by classical studies according to various traditions. 
How can we quickly and progressively harmonize the proliferation of particular branches 
of study with the necessity of forming a synthesis of them, and of preserving among men the 
faculties of contemplation and observation which lead to wisdom? (#56) 
17 
 
Such Lonerganian-sounding quotations from Gaudium et spes could easily be multiplied. The artisans of 
a new humanity must know how to synthesize the methods and results of the contemporary sciences with 
traditional forms of wisdom and virtue. This is a job that requires intellectual conversion.  
Many disagreements over the meaning of Vatican II have often revolved around this question of 
continuity. Neil Ormerod draws upon Lonergan in order to develop a suitable framework for addressing 
this matter. He argues that focusing on continuity/discontinuity for understanding change in the Church 
constitutes a weak starting point. Although John Henry Newman offered an intelligent and still influential 
version of this approach, it stays mainly on the level of description and thus remains mired in the realm of 
commonsense.  Ormerod then examines Alasdair McIntyre’s more explanatory approach that moves to 
the realm of theory.  Finally he articulates a Lonergan-based “ontology of meaning” in order to provide 
the most suitable framework. For addressing understanding change in the Church.  
An ontology of meaning requires a turn to the realm of interiority and is explicitly linked with 
intellectual conversion.
31
 Deeper than questions about continuity and discontinuity lie questions about the 
authenticity or inauthenticity of the identifiable changes that have taken place. Ormerod addresses how 
continuity remains an important concern as new contexts and frames of reference emerge.  Earlier 
meanings need to be transposed within new frames of reference. Grasping new meanings depends upon 
the ability of a community to upon the ability to integrate them with “prior presupposed insights.”32 
Ormerod makes uses of Lonergan’s discussion of the various function of meaning to argue that even as 
the constitutive, communicative and effective functions of the meanings of “Church” change, the 
cognitive meaning can remain stable.
33
  
Ormerod’s treatment of the continuity/discontinuity debate can serve as a model for how 
intellectual conversion opens up common ground within which the concerns associated with both the left 
and the right can be given fair treatment. The move to interiority with a focus on questions of authenticity 
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emphasizes both the needed changes that are taking place as well as the importance of continuity in the 
Church. Basic questions about change and continuity arise for people who are living out their faith in the 
commonsense realm. Is the post-Vatican II Church somehow the same entity as the pre-Vatican II 
Church? Is there a tradition that is being handed down in a lived manner through the generations and 
down through the centuries? Is the Jesus Christ whom I receive in the Eucharist somehow the same Jesus 
Christ who walked the earth two thousand years ago? Is there a continuous link between the Church that 
Christ founded and the Catholic Church? Can we say, along with Vatican II’s Decree on Ecumenism, that 
unity belongs to the Catholic Church as a gift that it can never lose? Do we live in Christian solidarity 
with voices in our past who have called the Church our Mother?
34
 
I have sometimes heard my own friends and colleagues speaking of the pre- and post-Vatican II 
Churches as if they were so entirely different as to have nothing to do with each other. It is my impression 
that in the academic world, we often strive to overcome what Lonergan called “commonsense bias” so 
that we can develop and implement solutions to social problems based more on good theory than on 
individual and group self-centeredness. Lonergan himself devoted much attention to the overcoming of 
commonsense bias. When it came to speaking about “intellectual conversion,” however, Lonergan had 
more to say about being able to understand how the realms of commonsense and theory need to be 
grasped as complementary ways of knowing. In my judgment, we need to pay great attention to this task 
today.  
Intellectual conversion involves taking a turn inside, an examination of what one is doing when 
one is understanding and knowing. It is an ongoing process, not something that one completes and for 
which one then receives a degree. One of the things intellectual conversion permits you to do is to 
understand that there are different ways of knowing, and that, sometimes, positions that at first may 
appear to be contradictory can be understood as complementary.  I am suggesting further that in the 
current situation, in which there are tendencies toward polarization, it would be a good thing if many 
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people would consciously strive to make the legitimate concerns of conflicting parties their own, if they 
would engage the tensions within themselves, and if they would, in collaboration with others, try to 
achieve a higher viewpoint, even if for no other reason than for the sake of the unity of the Church. 
It may be that in some cases one side is right and the other wrong, or more likely one side is much more 
right and the other side is much more wrong. Lonergan explains that some differences reflect horizons 
that are contradictory. Other differences may be traced to various forms of human inauthenticity.
35
 It is 
my belief, though, that it is worth taking the risk that many of the divisions that we face today will turn 
out to be about viewpoints that differ in potentially complementary ways. We need more theologians 
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